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This paper studies Pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with infinitely-lived individuals
whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov process. The study yields
two main results. First, when individuals are risk neutral, the fraction of individuals who face a
positive marginal income tax rate is always positive but converges to zero. Moreover, the tax rate
these individuals face also goes to zero. Second, Pareto efficient income tax systems can be time-












This paper studies Pareto eﬃcient income taxation in a dynamic version of the classic Mirrlees
model (Mirrlees (1971)). It assumes that individuals are inﬁnitely-lived and that their income
generating abilities vary stochastically from period to period. In the tradition of the literature
following Mirrlees (1971), the paper seeks to understand the nature of the distortions implied by
eﬃcient taxation. It develops a tractable model that is rich enough to shed light on the dynamic
evolution of these distortions. The model assumes that, in any period, there are two ability types
- low and high - and that individuals’ abilities follow a Markov process. Thus, an individual’s
current ability is a suﬃcient statistic for predicting his ability in the next period. Individuals’
per period utility functions are additively separable in consumption and leisure and much of the
analysis focuses on the case in which individuals are risk neutral. Under the latter assumption,
the eﬃciency problem is simply one of minimizing distortions in labor supply.
When individuals’ income generating abilities are constant over time, Pareto eﬃcient income
taxation is basically the same as in the static two-type Mirrlees model. Eﬃcient tax systems are
stationary. Low ability individuals face a positive marginal tax rate and their labor supply is
distorted downwards. High ability individuals face a zero marginal tax rate and their labor supply
is undistorted. However, when ability types are not perfectly correlated over time, the results are
dramatically diﬀerent. Eﬃcient tax systems are non-stationary and the only individuals whose
labor supply is distorted are those who currently are and have always been low ability.A l lo t h e r
individuals face a zero marginal rate of taxation. Moreover, the degree to which these perpetual
low types have their labor supply distorted converges to zero, so that not only is the fraction
of individuals who face a positive marginal tax rate converging to zero, but the tax rate these
individuals are facing goes to zero. Thus, in a very strong sense, the distortions caused by eﬃcient
income tax schemes converge to zero over time.
When individuals are risk averse, a tax system must not only account for distortions in indi-
viduals’ labor supply but also for distortions in the allocation of consumption across states and
time. We show in a two-period version of the model, that with risk aversion, individuals who are
low ability in the second period face a positive marginal tax rate even if they were previously high
ability. Thus, risk neutrality is a necessary condition for the result described above. However,
we also show that the distortion imposed on those who become low types in the second period is
1close to zero when individuals are only slightly risk averse and that the basic pattern of earnings
under an eﬃcient tax system is the same as in the risk neutral case. Thus, the broad features of
eﬃcient tax systems that we identify in our basic model are robust to introducing risk aversion.
A second interesting feature of Pareto eﬃcient income tax systems in our environment is that
they can be time consistent even when the correlation in individuals’ ability types is large. As
pointed out by Roberts (1984), when ability types are constant over time, Pareto eﬃcient income
tax systems are not time-consistent. Distortionary taxation is necessary to extract individuals’
private information. But after individuals have revealed it, the government will ﬁnd it optimal
to eliminate such distortions, making the original tax system non credible. However, when ability
types are stochastic, residual uncertainty remains, because an individual may change type. Ac-
cordingly, the government must still screen types in the remaining periods. We establish a lower
bound on the correlation in types such that below it the ex post optimal distortion is the same
as the ex ante optimal distortion and the optimal tax system is time consistent. We also show
that when the correlation of types is above this bound, it is governments with higher spending
commitments and/or more ambitious redistributive objectives who ﬁnd it harder to commit to
implement eﬃcient income tax systems.
The paper contributes to a large literature on dynamic optimal taxation. The bulk of this
has studied the optimal taxation of labor income and wealth under the assumption that the
government is constrained to use linear taxes (see Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a review). This
paper follows the mechanism design approach of Mirrlees (1971) and models the informational
asymmetries that preclude the use of non-distortionary taxation. Thus, we make no ap r i o r i
restrictions on the type of taxes the government may use. Other papers in this tradition include
Albanesi and Sleet (2003), Brito et al (1991), Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), Golosov, Kocherlakota
and Tsyvinsky (2003), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003) and Werning (2002). Of these, our paper
is closest to Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinsky (2003).1 They also consider an inﬁnitely-
lived economy in which individuals’ income generating abilities vary over time. Their model is
much more general than ours, in the sense that it includes capital and multiple consumption
1 The other papers make diﬀerent assumptions about the dynamic evolution of individuals’ unobservable types.
Brito et al (1991) assume that individuals income generating abilities are constant. Werning (2002) assumes
that individuals’ productive abilities are constant but adds in an observable technology shock which impacts
wages. Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003) assume a very speciﬁc pattern of shocks
- individuals have constant income generating abilities unless they become disabled, which is an absorbing state.
Albanesi and Sleet (2003) assume that individuals diﬀer by their leisure preferences rather than their income
generating abilities. These preferences are uncorrelated across periods.
2goods and imposes less structure on the stochastic evolution of abilities. However, they provide
only a partial characterization of Pareto eﬃcient allocations. In particular, they do not obtain
results about distortions in labor supply. Our more restrictive assumptions allow us to actually
provide a full characterization of Pareto eﬃcient allocations. Moreover, they assume, along with
all the literature cited above, that the government has full commitment power, ignoring the time
consistency problem.
In fully characterizing Pareto eﬃcient allocations and studying their time consistency, our pa-
per draws on the dynamic contracting literature. In particular, we follow the analytical approach
employed by Battaglini (2003a) to study a monopoly pricing problem with long-lived consumers
whose tastes evolve according to a Markov process. We show that his approach can be fruitfully
applied to the problem of optimal income taxation. The taxation problem is somewhat more
involved than the pricing problem, in part because it involves characterizing the entire Pareto
frontier rather than simply ﬁnding the proﬁt maximizing solution. Among other things, char-
acterizing the entire frontier helps us understand the role of the government’s initial spending
commitments and redistributive objectives in determining the time consistency of eﬃcient allo-
cations. Our analysis also extends Battaglini’s work by investigating the robustness of optimal
policies to risk aversion.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the
model. Section 3 explains how we characterize Pareto eﬃcient allocations. Section 4 describes the
properties of Pareto eﬃcient allocations and draws out their implications for the eﬃcient taxation
of labor income. Section 5 studies a two period version of the model in which agents are risk averse
and explains how risk aversion modiﬁes the conclusions. Section 6 analyses the time consistency
of Pareto eﬃcient allocations and section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We study an economy populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived individuals. There are two
goods - consumption and leisure. In each period t, individuals get utility from consumption xt and
work lt according to the utility function xt−ϕ(lt)w h e r eϕ is increasing, strictly convex, and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable. Individuals are endowed with l units of time in each period. To avoid
having to worry about corner solutions, we assume that ϕ0(0) = 0 and that liml→l ϕ0(l)=∞.
Individuals discount the future at rate δ < 1a n dc a nb o r r o wo rl e n da tt h ee x o g e n o u s l yﬁxed
3interest rate r = 1
δ − 1.
Individuals diﬀer in their income generating abilities. In period t, an individual with income
generating ability θt earns income yt = θtlt if he works an amount lt.I ne a c hp e r i o d ,t h e r ea r ej u s t
two ability levels, low and high, denoted by {θL,θH} where 0 < θL < θH. However, individuals’
abilities may diﬀer across periods. Speciﬁcally, each individual’s ability follows a Markov process









We assume that types are correlated (i.e., that αHH ≥ αLH), but we do not make assumptions
on the degree of correlation. A fraction µ ∈ (0,1) of individuals are high types in period one.
The economy also has a government. In each period, this government spends an amount G.
While this spending does not directly impact individuals’ utilities, the government must raise the
revenue necessary to ﬁnance it.
A history for an individual at time t consists of a list of his previous t − 1 abilities; i.e.,
ht = {θ1,...,θt−1}.L e t h1 = ∅ denote the history at time 1 and let H denote the set of all
histories. Let the notation ht+j º ht mean that ht+j follows ht (i.e., its ﬁrst t−1c o m p o n e n t sa r e
equal to ht).
An allocation in this economy is described by (x,y)={(xt(θt;ht),y t(θt;ht))}∞
t=1.H e r e
(xt(θt;ht),y t(θt;ht)) is the consumption-earnings bundle of those individuals who have ability








This says that the present value of consumption and government spending equals the present value
of earnings. The expected lifetime utility of an individual with high ability in period one under
such an allocation is
V (θH | h1)=
∞ X
t=1
δt−1E[xt(θt;ht) − ϕ(yt(θt;ht)/θt) | θ1 = θH],
2 Throughout the paper, we will ignore non-negativity constraints on individuals’ consumptions.
4while that of an individual with low ability in period one is
V (θL | h1)=
∞ X
t=1
δt−1E[xt(θt;ht) − ϕ(yt(θt;ht)/θt) | θ1 = θL].
An allocation is eﬃcient if, for some u, it solves the problem
max
(x,y)
V (θH | h1)








Thus, it maximizes the expected utility of those who are high types in period one subject to giving
a ﬁxed level of utility to those who are low types and the aggregate resource constraint.
It is straightforward to show that an allocation (x,y)i se ﬃcient if and only if the earnings




and the consumption path x is such that UL and R hold with equality. The surplus maximizing
earnings path has the property that individuals work up until the point at which their marginal
disutility of work equals their marginal product. More precisely, in any period t after any history
ht,y t(θH;ht)m u s te q u a ly∗(θH)a n dyt(θL;ht)m u s te q u a ly∗(θL)w h e r e
y∗(θ) = argmax{y − ϕ(y/θ):y/θ ∈ [0,l]} θ ∈ {θL,θH}.
If the government can observe individuals’ abilities, it can realize any utility allocation on the
Pareto frontier through a very simple stationary tax system. All high ability individuals in any
period are required to pay a lump sum tax T∗
H and all low ability individuals must pay a tax
T∗
L. These taxes are chosen so that (i) the present value of tax receipts equals the present value
of government expenditures and (ii) those who begin period one as low types have the required
expected utility of u. Given this system, high ability individuals will choose to earn y∗(θH)i na n y
period and low ability individuals will choose to earn y∗(θL).
Eﬃcient allocations will be diﬃcult to realize when the government is unable to observe indi-
viduals’ income generating abilities and hence unable to impose ability-speciﬁcl u m ps u mt a x e s .
5Accounting for this unobservability, requires ensuring that it is always in individuals’ interests to
claim the bundles intended for them. This requires that the allocation satisfy the following set of
incentive constraints. For all time periods t and histories ht,
xt(θH;ht) − ϕ(yt(θH;ht)/θH)+δEθHV (θt+1 |(ht,θH))
≥ xt(θL;ht) − ϕ(yt(θL;ht)/θH)+δEθHV (θt+1 |(ht,θL)) (ICH(ht))
and
xt(θL;ht) − ϕ(yt(θL;ht)/θL)+δEθLV (θt+1 |(ht,θL))
≥ xt(θH;ht) − ϕ(yt(θH;ht)/θL)+δEθLV (θt+1 |(ht,θH)) (ICL(ht)),
where V (θt | ht) denotes the expected lifetime utility of an individual who has type θt in period
t after history ht. These constraints ensure that in any period t after any history ht individuals
are always better oﬀ with the bundle intended for them than the bundle intended for any other
individual they could credibly claim to be.
We say that an allocation is second best eﬃcient if, for some u, it solves the problem
max
(x,y)
V (θH | h1)( PI)
s.t. UL,R ,a n dI C H(ht)&ICL(ht) for all t & ht
I nt h es e q u e l ,w er e f e rt ot h i sa st h egeneral problem. Our interest lies in understanding what
second best eﬃcient allocations look like and how they may be decentralized via tax-transfer
systems. To make the problem interesting, we restrict consideration to cases in which G and u
are suﬃciently high that any eﬃcient allocation in which those who are low types in period one
have expected utility u violates at least one of the high types’ incentive constraints.
3 Solution procedure
To characterize second best eﬃcient allocations, we study the following relaxed problem:
max
(x,y)
V (θH | h1)( PII)
s.t. UL,R ,a n dI C H(ht) for all t & ht
6The relaxed problem imposes the incentive constraints after any history only for those who are
currently high types. We will ﬁrst characterize the solution to the relaxed problem and then
explain the relationship between the relaxed and general problems.
Our ﬁrst observation about the relaxed problem is:
Lemma 1 Let (x,y) solve the relaxed problem. Then both UL and ICH(h1) hold with equality.
The reason why the period one incentive constraint is binding is that, if it were not, then by
transferring resources forward in time as necessary, we could assure that none of the incentive
constraints were satisﬁe d . B u tt h e nt h es o l u t i o nt ot h er e l a x e dp r o b l e mw o u l db ea ne ﬃcient
allocation and, by assumption, must violate at least one of the high type’s incentive constraints.
Lemma 1 does not imply that all the incentive constraints are binding because the solution
may involve giving those who are high types in the future suﬃcient consumption that they are
strictly better oﬀ not masquerading as low types. It turns out, however, that this possibility can
be ignored.
Lemma 2 Let (x,y) be an allocation satisfying the constraints of the relaxed problem. Then there
exists x0 such that (x0,y) satisﬁes all the constraints and yields the same value of the objective
function as (x,y) but also satisﬁes ICH(ht) with equality for all periods t>1 and all histories ht.
To understand this result, suppose that under the allocation (x,y) an incentive constraint is
not binding for individuals who are high types at some period t>1a f t e rs o m eh i s t o r yht =
(ht−1,θt−1). Then, we can make it bind by reducing the high types’ consumption in that period
and giving the expected present value to those with history ht−1 and ability θt−1 in period t − 1.
If θt−1 = θH then this has no implications for the incentive constraint of the high types in period
t − 1 with history ht−1. The gain in consumption in period t − 1i se x a c t l yo ﬀset by the loss in
expected consumption should they remain high types in period t.I fθt−1 = θL then the transfer
does have implications for the incentive constraint of the high types in period t − 1 with history
ht−1. On the one hand, masquerading as low types in period t − 1 now yields more consumption
in period t − 1. On the other, it yields less consumption in period t if individuals remain high
types. It turns out that because high types are more likely to remain high types than are low
types to become high types, the cost of lower future consumption outweighs the beneﬁto fh i g h e r
current consumption so that the incentive constraint still holds. Indeed, the transfer leads the
incentive constraint of the high type in period t − 1 with history ht−1 to be satisﬁed strictly.
However, we can repeat the process by reducing the consumption of the high type in period t−1
7with history ht−1 =( ht−2,θt−2) and giving the expected present value to those with history ht−2
and ability θt−2 in period t − 2. By repeating this process as many times as necessary, we ﬁnd a
consumption allocation x0 that satisﬁes all the incentive constraints with equality except possibly
the ﬁrst period constraint.
It follows from Lemma 1 and 2 that there is no loss of generality in assuming that in the
solution to the relaxed problem ICH(ht) holds with equality for all t and ht. We can use this fact
to write the expected lifetime utility of an individual with high ability after history ht as
V (θH | ht)=V (θL | ht)+Φ(yt(θL;ht)) + ∆EV(θt+1 | (ht,θL)) (1)
where Φ(y)=ϕ(y/θL) − ϕ(y/θH)a n d∆EV(θt+1 | (ht,θL)) is the diﬀerence in the continuation
values for the two types EθHV (θt+1 | (ht,θL)) − EθLV (θt+1 | (ht,θL)). By successively using this
equation, we can write the diﬀerence in the continuation values as solely a function of the earnings
of an individual who is a low type in period t and remains one thereafter. Denote by H◦ (ht)t h e
set of histories following a history ht in which in all the periods including and after t the individual
has low ability. Let h◦
t+j denote an element of H◦ (ht). Then we can use (1) to show that:
Lemma 3 Let (x,y) be an allocation satisfying ICH(ht) with equality for all periods t and all
histories ht. Then, the utility of an individual with history ht who is a high type in period t can
be written as:
V (θH | ht)=
∞ X
j=0






+ V (θL | ht). (2)
This result can in turn be used to establish:











s.t. G ≤ (1 − δ)
∞ X
t=1











The problem described in Lemma 4 is straightforward to solve. Letting γ be the multiplier on


















8The ﬁrst term is Marshallian aggregate surplus, while the second term represents the loss of
surplus resulting from having to meet the incentive constraints. Letting h∗
t = h◦
1+(t−1),t h eﬁrst
order conditions are that for all t and ht 6= h∗
t
ϕ0(yt(θt;ht)/θt)=θt (5)
and for all t and ht = h∗
t















As we show in the proof of Proposition 1, the value of the multiplier γ is such that µ>1/γ (1 − δ),
so that the right hand side of (6) is positive.
Before we study the implications of these conditions, we ﬁrst clarify the relationship between
the relaxed and general problems.
Lemma 5 Let (x,y) be an allocation with the property that the earnings levels solve the problem
described in Lemma 4 and the consumption levels are such as to make UL and ICH(ht) (for all t
and ht) hold with equality. Then, (x,y) i sas e c o n db e s te ﬃcient allocation. Conversely, if (x,y)
is a second best eﬃcient allocation, then the earnings levels must solve the problem described in
Lemma 4.
It follows from this result that if (x,y)i sas e c o n db e s te ﬃcient allocation then the earnings levels
satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions (5) and (6). In the next section, we use this to derive some results
about the nature of second best eﬃcient allocations. Before doing that, it is worth noting that the
relationship between the relaxed and general problems is somewhat non-standard. In a standard
problem, it is the case that any solution to the relaxed problem solves the general problem. In
our problem, only those solutions that satisfy the constraints with equality necessarily solve the
general problem.
4S e c o n d b e s t e ﬃcient allocations
To set the stage for our ﬁrst main result, we brieﬂy describe the nature of second best eﬃcient
allocations in which ability types are perfectly correlated over time, so that αHH = αLL =1 .
Under this assumption, the model is a replication of the Mirrlees model with two ability types.
The following proposition will therefore come as no surprise.
Proposition 1 Suppose that ability types are perfectly correlated over time. Then, in any second
best eﬃcient allocation, the earnings of individuals are constant over time. The earnings of those
with high ability are undistorted (i.e., they earn y∗(θH) each period), while the earnings of those
with low ability are distorted downward (i.e., they earn less than y∗(θL) each period).
9Proof: In any period t, high ability individuals have history ht =( θH,...,θH). The ﬁrst order
condition (5) then implies that yt(θH;ht)=y∗(θH). Low ability individuals, on the other hand,
have history ht =( θL,...,θL)=h∗
t so that (6) implies their earnings satisfy















Since αHL = 0, the latter implies that:









Assuming that µ>1/γ(1 − δ), (7) implies that low types earn a constant amount each period
w h i c hi sl e s st h a ny∗(θL).
It only remains to prove that µ>1/γ(1 − δ). Assume, ﬁrst that µ =1 /γ(1 − δ). Then (7)
implies that for all t, yt(θL;h∗
t)=y∗(θL). This means that the earnings levels that solve the
problem described in Lemma 4, denoted e y,a r eﬁr s tb e s te ﬃcient. But we know by assumption
that if (x,y) solves the relaxed problem then y is not ﬁr s tb e s te ﬃcient and hence cannot equal
e y. This contradicts Lemma 4.
Next suppose that µ<1/γ(1 − δ). Let e y denote the associated optimal earnings levels. Let
e x be such as to make ICH(ht)( f o ra l lt and ht)a n dUL hold with equality given e y. Then, we
will show that (e x, e y) cannot solve the relaxed problem - a contradiction. To see this, consider a
marginal reduction dy in e y1(θL;h1)a n dc h o o s edx so as to keep the period one low type’s utility
constant; i.e., so that
e x1(θL;h1) − dx − ϕ(
e y1(θL;h1) − dy
θL









Note that ICH(h1) is now still satisﬁed, because the high type now ﬁnds the low type’s bundle
less attractive because it involves less earnings. However, the change in revenues is
dR =( 1− µ)[dx − dy]=( 1− µ)[
ϕ0(e y1(θL;h1))
θL
− 1]dy > 0.
This change is positive since µ<1/γ(1 − δ)i m p l i e st h a t1−
ϕ0(e y1(θL;h1)/θL)
θL < 0. Now take this
revenue increase and divide it among those who are high types in period one; i.e., raise e x1(θH;h1)
10by dR/µ. Clearly, this change makes the high types strictly better oﬀ, which since it violates none
of the constraints, means that (e x, e y) cannot solve the relaxed problem. Q.E.D.
Thus, the labor supply of high ability individuals is undistorted, while the labor supply of
low ability individuals is distorted downwards. This is to counteract the incentives of high ability
types to masquerade as low ability types. Any utility allocation on the (second best) Pareto
frontier can be realized through a very simple stationary tax system. Let y∗∗
L denote the amount
earned by low ability individuals in the utility allocation in question. Let x∗
L be the constant level
of consumption just suﬃcient to give low ability individuals utility level u given that they are
working y∗∗







H be the constant level of consumption just suﬃcient to prevent high ability individuals from










Then if the government requires that in each period individuals pay taxes according to the schedule





L, it can achieve the utility allocation
in question. This tax schedule has a zero marginal rate in the neighborhood of the income level
y∗(θH) but a positive marginal rate in the neighborhood of y∗
LL.3
With this as background, we now present our ﬁrst main result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ability types are not perfectly correlated over time. Then, in any
second best eﬃcient allocation, the earnings of individuals who are currently, or have at some
point been, high types are undistorted (i.e., they earn y∗(θt) in period t when they have ability
θt). The earnings of individuals who are currently and have always been low types are distorted
downwards (i.e., they earn less than y∗(θL)). However, the extent of this distortion decreases over
time converging to 0 as t →∞ .
Proof: The ﬁrst order conditions tell us that for all t and ht 6= h∗
t
ϕ0(yt(θt;ht)/θt)=θt (8)






L. The schedule must be such that y∗
LL maximizes y−T(y)−ϕ(y/θL)a n dy∗
H
maximizes y −T(y)−ϕ(y/θH). Since T(y) is smooth, this requires that T0(y∗
LL)e q u a l1−ϕ(y∗
LL/θL)/θL which is
positive and that T0(y∗
H)e q u a l1−ϕ(y∗
H/θH)/θH which is zero. Of course, there is no reason that the government
need use such a smooth schedule. It could, for example, set T(y) equal to inﬁnity for any y other than y∗
LL or y∗
H.
In this case, the notion of a marginal rate of taxation is not well deﬁned.
11and for all t and ht = h∗
t















If an individual is currently or has at some point been a high type, then ht 6= h∗
t and, from (8), it
can be seen that the ﬁrst order conditions imply that they work up until the point at which their
marginal disutility of work ϕ0(y/θt) equals their wage θt. If an individual is currently and has
always been a low type then ht = h∗
t and, from (9), it can be seen that the ﬁrst order conditions
imply that they work less than the amount at which their marginal disutility of work equals their







decreasing in t and converges to zero as t →∞ .T h eﬁrst order condition therefore implies that
yt(θL;h∗
t)/θL is decreasing in t and converges to y∗(θL)/θL as t →∞ . Q.E.D.
The proposition implies that when ability types are not perfectly correlated over time, the
fraction of individuals in any period whose labor supply is distorted in any second best eﬃcient
allocation is decreasing and converges to zero as t →∞ . Moreover, the degree to which these
individuals have their labor supply distorted also converges to zero. Thus, in a very strong sense,
the distortion caused by imperfect observability of individuals’ abilities goes to zero.
To understand the ﬁrst part of the proposition, consider a group of individuals at some time
t who share the same history ht. Suppose that at some point in the past these individuals were
high ability so that ht 6= h∗
t. By Proposition 2, the earnings of these individuals are undistorted at
time t. This is obviously optimal for those with high ability at time t,s oc o n s i d e rt h o s ew i t hl o w
ability. Suppose, to the contrary, that the earnings of these individuals are distorted downwards.
Then, if we were to increase their earnings slightly in period t w ew o u l dm a k et h e mb e t t e ro ﬀ.O f
course, such a change would also necessitate an increase in the consumption of those who have high
ability at time t to prevent them from masquerading as low types. This will reduce government
revenues. However, this reduction in expected revenues can be ﬁnanced by a concordant reduction
in the consumption of these individuals in the period τ <tin which they were ﬁrst high types.
This reduction gives individuals with high ability in period τ and history hτ ¹ ht no incentive to
masquerade as low types. The reason is that the reduction in current consumption is oﬀset by the
increase in expected future consumption at time t. This marginal change in the allocation would
not cause any of the incentive constraints of low ability individuals to be violated since none of
these are binding.
12To understand the second part of the proposition,i ti su s e f u lt oc o n t r a s ti tw i t ht h er e s u l ti n
Proposition 1. As noted, with constant types the earnings of low ability individuals are distorted
d o w n w a r d sa n dt h ed e g r e eo fd i s t o r t i o ni sc o n s t a n to v e rt i m e .T h es i z eo ft h ed i s t o r t i o ni sd e t e r -
mined by a simple marginal cost - marginal beneﬁt argument. A lower distortion increases the
Marshallian surplus generated by an individual and therefore obviously increases welfare. How-
ever, it also increases the consumption that needs to be given to individuals with high ability.
This reduces tax revenues for the government and increases the shadow cost of taxation γ.A tt h e
optimum, the marginal increase in surplus is exactly compensated by the marginal reduction in
revenues. With constant abilities the marginal cost/beneﬁt ratio is constant throughout periods.
After any period t, the marginal beneﬁt of a lower distortion is proportional to the fraction of low
types (the constant 1 − µ), because types never change. Similarly, the marginal cost is constant:
it is proportional to the fraction of high types whose consumption must be raised (the constant
µ) and the shadow cost of taxation: µ − 1/γ(1 − δ). When types change over time, the marginal
cost/beneﬁt ratio is not constant, because, depending on the realized history, there is a diﬀerent
composition of the population. The marginal beneﬁt of a lower distortion in the earnings of those
individuals who at time t are and have always been low types is proportional to the fraction of
such individuals in the population: (1 − µ)α
t−1
LL . The marginal cost, evaluated at time 1, also
depends on the time t of the change. At time t the consumption of high ability individuals who
have previously been low types increases by, say, ∆Rt.A tt i m et−1 the expected utility of those
who are and have always been low types increases because they can become high types at time t
and beneﬁt from the increase in consumption at that time. Part of this extra expected utility can
be taxed away at t − 1, but not all since incentive compatibility must be satisﬁed at that time as
well. At time t − 1 individuals who have high ability for the ﬁrst time can not receive less than
what they would receive if they chooses the option designed for those who remain low types. Even
if we completely tax away the expected increase in consumption of those who, at time t − 1, are
and have always been low types with a tax Tt−1 such that αLH∆Rt −Tt−1 = 0, those individuals
who have high ability at time t − 1 after previously being low types must receive an increase
in consumption equal to ∆Rt−1 =( αHH∆Rt − Tt−1) − (αLH∆Rt − Tt−1)=( αHH − αLH)∆Rt.
Repeating the same argument, if we try and tax away these gains at t − 2, we must provide an
increase in consumption at time t − 2 for those individuals who have high ability for the ﬁrst
time equal to ∆Rt−2 =( αHH − αLH)∆Rt−1 =( αHH − αLH)
2 ∆Rt. Proceeding backward, we
13arrive to an increase in the consumption of those who are high ability at time 1 proportional to
(αHH − αLH)
t−1. Since these individuals make up a fraction µ of the population, the marginal
cost of a lower distortion in the earnings of those individuals who at time t are and have always
been low types is proportional to µ(αHH − αLH)
t−1. Accordingly, the marginal cost/beneﬁtr a t i o







. As the cost/beneﬁt ratio of a lower distortion
vanishes over time,4 the distortion vanishes with it.
When ability types are not perfectly correlated, it is no longer the case that utility allocations
on the (second best) Pareto frontier can be realized through a stationary tax system. Proposition
2 implies that the marginal tax rates individuals face should depend upon their entire history of
earnings. What might such a non—stationary tax system look like? To provide a feel for this, we
will describe a particular tax system that can realize utility allocations on the Pareto frontier.
It should be stressed that this is not the only possibility. Given that individuals have constant
marginal utility of consumption, the allocation of consumption across time or states is irrelevant
for individuals’ utility and this gives a great deal of ﬂexibility in choosing consumption paths and
hence tax systems.
Consider a particular utility allocation on the Pareto frontier and let y denote the associated
earnings levels. These must solve the problem described in Lemma 4. Thus, yt(θH;ht)=y∗(θH)
for all t and ht and yt(θL;ht)=y∗(θL) for all t and all ht 6= h∗
t. To simplify notation, let
y∗
Lt = yt(θL;h∗
t) for all t.N o w ,c h o o s ex as follows. First, let the consumption of high types in
any period be constant, so that xt(θH;ht)=x∗
H for all t and ht for some x∗
H. In addition, let
the consumption of those who are currently low types but have previously been high types be
constant, so that xt(θL;ht)=x∗
L for all t and ht 6= h∗
t. Further, let this consumption be related
to x∗
H in the following way:
x∗
L = x∗
H − (ϕ(y∗(θH)/θH) − ϕ(y∗(θL)/θH)).





αLL < 1 because types are positively correlated.








L − (ϕ(y∗(θL)/θH) − ϕ(y∗
Lt/θH)) + δαHL{x∗









L − ϕ(y∗(θL)/θL) − (x∗
Lt+j − ϕ(y∗
Lt+j/θL))}.
It may be veriﬁed that x so constructed is such as to make the incentive constraints ICH(ht)( f o r
all t and ht) bind. To ensure UL binds, let x∗




by the above equations, then V (θL | h1)=u.
Now consider the features of the tax system that would decentralize the allocation (x,y). In
period 1, individuals would face a schedule T1(y)t h a tr e q u i r e st h e mt op a yat a xT1(y∗(θH)) =
y∗(θH)−x∗
H if they earn y∗(θH)a n dat a xT1(y∗
L1)=y∗
L1 −x∗
L1 if they earn y∗
L1.T h i sﬁrst period
schedule has a positive marginal rate at income y∗
L1 and a zero rate at income y∗(θH).
In the second period, the schedule individuals face depends upon their ﬁrst period earnings.
Those who earn y∗(θH)i nt h eﬁrst period face a schedule T2(y;y∗(θH)) that requires them to
pay a tax T2(y∗(θH);y∗(θH)) = y∗(θH) − x∗
H if they earn y∗(θH)a n dat a xT2(y∗(θL);y∗(θH)) =
y∗(θL)−x∗
L if they earn y∗(θL). This tax schedule has zero marginal rates in the neighborhood of
both the income levels y∗(θH)a n dy∗(θL). Those who earn y∗
L1 in the ﬁrst period, face a schedule
T2(y;y∗
L1) that requires them to pay a tax T2(y∗(θH);y∗
L1)=y∗(θH) − x∗
H if they earn y∗(θH)




L2 if they earn y∗
L2. This tax schedule has a zero marginal rate
in the neighborhood of y∗(θH) but a positive marginal rate in the neighborhood of y∗
L2.T h u s ,
the tax schedule T2(y;y∗




L1, the tax schedule T2(y;y∗
L1) has a lower marginal rate in the
neighborhood of y∗
L2 than the ﬁrst period tax schedule.
In the third period, those who had earned y∗(θH)i nt h eﬁrst period continue to face the
schedule T2(y;y∗(θH)) as do those who earned y∗(θH) in the second period. Those who earned
y∗
L1 and y∗
L2 in the ﬁrst two periods, face the schedule T3(y;y∗
L1,y∗










if they earn y∗
L3.S i n c ey∗
L3 >y ∗
L2, the tax schedule T3(y;y∗
L1,y∗
L2) involves a lower marginal rate
in the neighborhood of y∗
L3 than does the second period tax schedule. As time progresses, more
and more individuals come under the tax schedule T2(y;y∗(θH)). Moreover, the schedule faced by
those with an uninterrupted history of low earnings Tt(y;y∗
L1,..,y∗
Lt−1) converges to the schedule
15T2(y;y∗(θH)).
5 Implications of risk aversion
The model studied so far has assumed that individuals are risk neutral. This implies that individ-
uals are indiﬀerent as to the allocation of consumption across time and states. This facilitates a
clean focus on the problem of designing taxation to minimize distortions in labor supply. In this
section, we extend the model to incorporate risk aversion and investigate how this impacts the
results.
To incorporate risk aversion, we assume that:
ut =( xt)β − ϕ(lt) (10)
where β ∈ (0,1). As β approaches 1individuals become risk neutral and we have the original
model. For tractability, in this section we focus on a two-period version of the model.
In the two-period model, an allocation can be fully described by
(x,y)={(xL,x H,x LL,x LH,x HL,x HH);(yL,y H,y LL,y LH,y HL,y HH)}.
Thus, (xL,y L) is the consumption-earnings bundle intended for those individuals who have low
ability in period one; (xLL,y LL) is the period two bundle intended for those who have low ability
in both periods; and so on. As before, an allocation is eﬃcient if, for some u, it solves the problem
max[(xH)β − ϕ(yH/θH)] + δ[αHH((xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH)) + αHL((xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θL))].
s.t. [(xL)β − ϕ(yL/θL)] + δ[αLL((xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θL)) + αLH((xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH))] ≥ u (UL)
and
[µxH +( 1− µ)xL + G]+δ[µ(αHHxHH + αHLxHL)+( 1− µ)(αLHxLH + αLLxLL)+G]
≤ [µyH +( 1− µ)yL]+δ[µ(αHHyHH + αHLyHL)+( 1− µ)(αLHyLH + αLLyLL)]. (R)
Eﬃcient allocations now have two properties. First, individuals’ consumption levels are con-
stant across time and states. Thus, for the period one high types xH = xHL = xHH and for
the low types xL = xLH = xLL. Second, there is no distortion in individuals’ labor supply
decisions. This requires that each individual should work up until the point at which their mar-
ginal disutility of work equals the marginal utility of the consumption that work produces. Thus,
θHβx
β−1
H = ϕ0(yH/θH), θLβx
β−1
HL = ϕ0(yHL/θL), and so on.
16Again, if the government can observe individuals’ abilities, it can realize eﬃcient allocations
with a simple tax system. Let y∗(T,θ) denote the earnings level that would maximize the static
utility of an individual with ability θ if he had to pay a lump sum tax T;t h a ti s ,
y∗(T,θ) = argmax{(y − T)β − ϕ(y/θ):y/θ ∈ [0,l]} θ ∈ {θL,θH}.
Then, any eﬃcient allocation (x,y) can be decentralized as follows. Individuals who are high
types in the ﬁrst period pay a lump sum tax TH where y∗(TH,θH)−TH = xH. They also pay this
tax in the second period if they remain high types. If they become low types, their tax burdens
are reduced in such a way as to maintain their consumption at the level it would be were they
high types. More precisely, they pay a tax THL such that y∗(THL,θL)−THL = xH.I ne ﬀect, the
tax system completely insures them against any consumption loss resulting from a shock in their
income generating ability. The story for those who are low types in the ﬁrst period is similar. In
the ﬁrst period, they pay the lump sum tax TL where y∗(TL,θL) − TL = xL.T h e ya l s op a yt h i s
tax in the second period if they remain low types. If they become high types, their tax burden is
increased in such a way as to maintain their consumption at the level it would be were they low
types. More precisely, they would pay a tax TLH such that y∗(TLH,θH)−TLH = xL. Individuals
have no incentive to save under this tax system, as it keeps their marginal utility of consumption
constant across time and states.
An allocation is second best eﬃcient if it solves the eﬃciency problem with the following
additional set of incentive constraints:
(xH)β − ϕ(yH/θH)+δ[αHH((xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH)) + αHL((xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θL))]
≥ (xL)β − ϕ(yL/θH)+δ[αHH((xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH)) + αHL((xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θL))] (IC(H))
(xL)β − ϕ(yL/θL)+δ[αLH((xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH)) + αLL((xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θL))]
≥ (xH)β − ϕ(yH/θL)+δ[αLH((xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH)) + αLL((xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θL))] (IC(L))
(xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH) ≥ (xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θH)( IC(HH))
(xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θL) ≥ (xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θL)( IC(HL))
(xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH) ≥ (xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θH)( IC(LH))
(xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θL) ≥ (xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θL)( IC(LL))
17The ﬁrst two constraints deal with the ﬁrst period and the remainder the second period. We
retain the assumption that when β =1 ,G and u are suﬃciently high that any eﬃcient allocation
in which those who are low types in period one have expected utility of at least u violates one or
more of the high types’ incentive constraints. Thus, the second best Pareto frontier lies strictly
inside the ﬁr s tb e s tf r o n t i e rw h e nβ =1 .
To solve for second best eﬃcient allocations we again consider the relaxed problem obtained
by ignoring the incentive constraints for low types. Thus we study the problem:
max
(x,y)
[(xH)β − ϕ(yH/θH)] + δ[αHH((xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH)) + αHL((xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θL))]
s.t. UL,R,IC(H),IC(HH),IC(LH).
While we are no longer able to prove generally that second best eﬃcient allocations must solve
the relaxed problem, we can show that this is the case for β suﬃciently large.
Lemma 6 In the two period model with risk averse individuals, there exist a β < 1 such that if
β ∈ (β,1), (x,y) is a second best eﬃcient allocation if and only if it solves the relaxed problem.
By analyzing the ﬁrst order conditions for the relaxed problem, we are able to establish:
Proposition 3 In the two period model with risk averse individuals, there exist a β < 1 such that
if β ∈ (β,1), in any second best eﬃcient allocation, the earnings of individuals who are high types
in either period are undistorted. The earnings of individuals who are low types in either period
are distorted downwards. However, the degree of distortion in the earnings of those who become
low types in the second period converges to 0 as β → 1. Moreover, those who are low types in both
periods earn more in the second period.
This proposition shows that once we introduce risk aversion, the result that in any second best
eﬃcient allocation only those who remain low types have their labor supply decisions distorted no
longer holds. Those who start out as high types and become low types in the second period, also
work less than the eﬃcient amount. However, as individuals become less and less risk averse the
degree of this distortion converges to zero. Moreover, the basic pattern of earnings in any second
best eﬃcient allocation is the same as in the risk neutral case. In particular, the earnings of those
who remain low types are increasing.
With risk aversion, the allocation of consumption across time and states is relevant for indi-
viduals’ utility and this explains why the earnings of individuals with history HL are distorted
downwards. Reducing the earnings level yHL lessens the incentive of those with history HH to
18pretend they have history HL. In the risk neutral case, this problem could be handled by in-
creasing the consumption of those with history HH and taking the expected discounted value
from high ability individuals in the ﬁrst period. But because individuals want to smooth their
consumption this intertemporal reallocation is no longer without cost.
What can be established about the allocation of consumption across time and states in a second
best eﬃcient allocation? Our next proposition addresses this.
Proposition 4 In the two period model with risk averse individuals, there exist a β < 1 such that
if β ∈ (β,1), in any second best eﬃcient allocation the consumption of individuals who are high
types in the ﬁrst period goes up if they remain high types in the second period and down if they
become low types. Similarly, the consumption of individuals who are low types in the ﬁrst period
goes up if they are high types in the second period and down if they are low types. Moreover, for
both low and high types, the marginal utility of consumption in the ﬁrst period is less than the
expected marginal utility of consumption in the second period.
Thus, when compared with eﬃcient allocations there are two distinct distortions in the allo-
cation of consumption. First, the allocation of con s u m p t i o na c r o s ss t a t e si sd i s t o r t e di nt h es e n s e
that individuals are not fully insured. If they are low types in the second period, their consump-
tion is lower than if they are high types. This is obviously a necessary condition for incentive
compatibility. Second, the allocation of consumption across time is distorted in the sense that
individuals consume more than is optimal in the ﬁrst period. This is a particular application of the
result ﬁrst established by Rogerson (1985) and since generalized and applied to optimal taxation
by Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinsky (2003). The intuition is the following. Because of the
incentive compatibility constraint, low types will supply less labor and enjoy lower consumption
in each period. The marginal utility of consumption of low types, therefore, is higher than the
marginal utility of high types in period two. Suppose, to the contrary, that the marginal utility
of consumption in the ﬁrst period were higher than the expected marginal utility in the second
period for some type. If we reduce the second period consumption of high and low types by some
amount ∆ incentive compatibility is preserved, since the utility of low types is reduced by more
than that of high types. This reduction frees ∆ units of consumption that can be used to increase
consumption in the ﬁrst period. But then, since the marginal increase in utility at t =1i sh i g h e r
that the expected reduction at t = 2, the change creates a Pareto improvement: and we have a
contradiction.
What would a tax system that could decentralize second best eﬃcient allocations look like?
Let (x,y) be the allocation we wish to decentralize. The ﬁrst period tax schedule T1(y)i ss u c h
19that T1(yH)=yH − xH and T1(yL)=yL − xL. The marginal rate of taxation is positive in
the neighborhood of yL and zero in the neighborhood of yH.T h o s e w h o e a r n yH in the ﬁrst
period face a second period tax schedule T2(y;yH)s u c ht h a tT2(yHH;yH)=yHH − xHH and
T2(yHL;yH)=yHL − xHL. The marginal rate of taxation is positive in the neighborhood of yHL
and zero in the neighborhood of yHH.T h o s ew h oe a r nyL in the ﬁrst period face a second period
tax schedule T2(y;yL)s u c ht h a tT2(yLH;yL)=yLH − xLH and T2(yLL;yL)=yLL − xLL.T h e
marginal rate of taxation is positive in the neighborhood of yLL and zero in the neighborhood of
yLH.
It is important to note that under this tax system, individuals have an incentive to save in the
ﬁrst period. As Proposition 4 demonstrates, x is such that for both types the marginal utility of
consumption in the ﬁrst period is less than the expected marginal utility of consumption in the
second period. This provides individuals with an incentive to transfer consumption forward. To
prevent this, it would be necessary to supplement the tax on earnings with a tax on capital income
from savings. The tax rate on saving should be suﬃcient to deter individuals from saving given
the consumptions x. Obviously, there are many choices of capital tax rates that would achieve
this goal.
6 Time consistency
Imagine that at the beginning of period one the government announces a tax/transfer system de-
signed to implement a particular utility allocation on the second best Pareto frontier. Individuals’
period one earnings choices would then reveal their period one types. If the government could
use this information to design a new tax/transfer system that was better for all individuals and
raised just as much revenue, one might imagine that it would be tempted to do so. In this case,
the original tax/transfer system would not be time consistent.
Up to this point, we have ignored this time consistency problem, implicitly assuming that the
government can credibly commit to the ex ante optimal tax/transfer system. The equilibrium
characterized in Section 4, is therefore a Ramsey equilibrium (Ramsey (1927)): the government
determines the optimal policy given individuals’ reaction functions. However, it is well known
that Ramsey optimal policies are often not time-consistent in the sense that even benevolent
20governments ﬁnd it ex post optimal to depart from them.5 In a model like ours, distortionary
taxation is necessary to extract individuals’ private information; after individuals have revealed it,
the government may ﬁnd it optimal to eliminate such distortions: but then the original tax system
would not be credible. This type of time-inconsist e n c yi nt h ec o n t e x to ft a x a t i o nw i t ha s y m m e t r i c
information was ﬁrst observed by Roberts (1984).
In this section we show that when individuals’ types can vary stochastically the time-inconsistency
problem may not arise. To analyze the issue we return to the basic model with quasi-linear utili-
ties and inﬁnite periods.6 We also impose the additional assumption that the disutility of labor
function has a positive third derivative; i.e., ϕ000(l) ≥ 0.7 This assumption guarantees that Φ00 > 0
which in turn implies that the Lagrangian for the maximization problem in Lemma 4 (4) is strictly
concave and that the eﬃcient earnings levels are unique.
We begin by providing a more precise deﬁnition of time consistency. We will work directly with
allocations rather than the tax-transfer systems that generate them. It is to be understood that a
particular tax/transfer system is time consistent if and only if the allocation it generates is time
consistent. Consider then a particular second best eﬃcient allocation (x∗,y∗) and imagine that
we are at the beginning of some period t ≥ 2. At that point, the government knows the histories
of all the individuals in the economy but not their period t types. Consider a group of individuals
with history ht. We are interested in whether the government can change the future allocation
intended for these individuals in such a way as to make them better oﬀ while still raising the same
revenue from them.
Let (xht,yht) denote a future allocation for those individuals who at time t have history ht;
i.e.,
(xht,yht)={(xt+j(θt+j;ht+j),y t+j(θt+j;ht+j)) | ∀ ht+j º ht}∞
j=0.
The future allocation implied by the eﬃcient allocation (x∗,y∗) is denoted (x∗
ht,y∗
ht). Let R∗ (ht)
5 The classic reference is Kydland and Prescott (1977). See Chari, Kehoe and Prescott (1988) and Stokey (1989)
for general discussion and surveys of the literature.
6 Our result also holds for a ﬁnite economy. This distinguishes it from Chari and Kehoe (1990) who show that
in inﬁnitely-lived economies Ramsey equilibria may be sustained by trigger strategies if the discount factor is high
enough.
7 This condition is satisﬁed by most common cost functions such as quadratic, logarithmic or exponential.









Finally, let V ∗(θ | ht) be the expected utility of a type θ after a history ht under (x∗,y∗).
Now consider the problem:
max
(xht,yht)
V (θH | ht)( PI
ht)
s.t. V (θL | ht) ≥ V ∗(θL | ht)
∞ X
j=0
δjE[yt+j(θt+j;ht+j) − xt+j(θt+j;ht+j)|ht] ≥ R∗ (ht)
and ICH(ht+j)&ICL(ht+j) for all ht+j º ht and j =0 ,1,..
Thus, we seek to maximize the expected utility of those individuals with history ht who are high
types at time t, subject to the constraints that (i) those who are low types in period t with
history ht obtain at least as much utility as they obtain under (x∗
ht,y∗
ht); (ii) the same expected
revenue is raised from these individuals as under (x∗
ht,y∗
ht); and (iii) the incentive compatibility
constraints for these individuals in period t and beyond are satisﬁed. Clearly, (x∗
ht,y∗
ht)s a t i s ﬁes
all the constraints of this problem. If (x∗
ht,y∗
ht) solves it, then the government cannot change the
future allocation intended for individuals with history ht in such a way as to make them better oﬀ
while still raising the same revenue from them. Therefore, we say that (x∗,y∗)i stime consistent
if for all periods t ≥ 2a n da l lh i s t o r i e sht,( x∗
ht,y∗
ht)i sas o l u t i o nt oPI
ht.8
We now have:










where γ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the maximization problem described in Lemma
4 that is solved by y∗.
The intuition underlying this result is the following. When ability types are perfectly correlated,
under the Ramsey tax system the government faces no residual uncertainty in period two and
8 This corresponds to the standard deﬁnition in the literature. See, for example, Kydland and Prescott (1977).
22beyond. Because of this, it could impose lump sum taxes from that point on and eliminate all
distortions in individuals’ labor supply. Accordingly, Ramsey optimal taxes can never be time
consistent. When types are stochastic, residual uncertainty remains because an individual may
change type. Thus, the government must still screen types in the remaining periods. Condition
(11) guarantees that the ex post optimal distortion is the same as the ex ante optimal distortion.
When this is the case, two competing forces oﬀset each other. On the one hand, in order to
create a Pareto improvement, the government must introduce a new tax system that involves less
distortions than the original one. This necessitates increasing the earnings of those individuals
whose earnings are distorted who, by Proposition 2, are those who currently are and always
have been low types. On the other hand, increasing the earnings of these individuals requires
compensating increases in consumption for those individuals with the same history who have
become high types. When condition (11) is satisﬁed, these compensating increases in consumption
are suﬃcient to oﬀset the revenue gains from the higher earnings of those who are still low types
and the net impact on revenue is negative.
From Lemma 7, we can derive our second main result:
Proposition 5 Let (x∗,y∗) be a second best eﬃcient allocation. Then: (i) if αLH =0 , (x∗,y∗)
is not time consistent; (ii) if αLH/αHH ≥ µ, (x∗,y∗) is time consistent; and (iii) if αLH/αHH ∈
(0,µ) there exists a threshold Ω∗ such that (x∗,y∗) is time consistent if and only if G+(1− δ)u ≤
Ω∗.
To understand how this result follows from the Lemma, recall that γ always exceeds 1/µ(1−δ)s o
that the right hand side of condition (11) is positive. This yields part (i). On the other hand, note
that the right hand side of this inequality is increasing in γ and converges to µ as γ approaches ∞.
Accordingly, condition (11) is necessarily satisﬁed when αLH/αHH exceeds µ which implies part
(ii). In the intermediate case, whether the condition is satisﬁed depends upon the precise value of
the Lagrange multiplier γ associated with y∗. The smaller it is, the more likely is the condition
to be satisﬁed. Since γ represents the marginal value of a unit relaxation in the government’s
revenue requirement, the degree to which it exceeds 1/µ(1 − δ) will depend upon the tightness of
the incentive constraints. This in turn will depend on the size of the revenue requirement G and
on the amount of redistribution the government intends to do as measured by u.
This proposition has two interesting implications. First, no matter how strong the correlation
between types, if it is anything less than perfect, there are conditions under which the Ramsey
optimal policy will be sustainable. This justiﬁes our claim in the introduction that Pareto eﬃcient
23income tax systems can be time-consistent even when the degree of correlation in ability types is
large. Second, in the intermediate case in which αLH/αHH ∈ (0,µ), Pareto eﬃcient tax systems
will be time consistent only when the government’s revenue requirement and its redistributive
goals are “not too large”. Thus, ceteris paribus, a government that starts with higher spending
commitments (for example, higher debt to repay) or more ambitious redistributive objectives will
ﬁnd it harder to implement second best optimal policies.
This second implication suggests a theoretical reason why the classic equity-eﬃciency trade oﬀ
(see, for example, Okun (1975)) may be steeper than previously thought. A well-known lesson of
public economics is that achieving stronger equity objectives requires more distortionary taxation
which reduces the size of the aggregate pie. Indeed, the Mirrlees model is designed precisely to
illustrate and quantify this trade oﬀ. Proposition 6 suggests that, in dynamic economies, stronger
equity objectives might lead second best optimal policies to be time inconsistent. This will force
governments to achieve their equity objectives with third best policies.9 These will lead to greater
distortions and larger reductions in the aggregate pie than suggested by the Mirrlees model.
7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated Pareto eﬃcient income taxation in an economy with inﬁnitely-lived
individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov process.
The investigation has yielded two novel conclusions. First, when individuals are risk neutral, the
fraction of individuals who face a positive marginal income tax rate converges to zero and, in
addition, the tax rate these individuals face also goes to zero. Thus, in the long run, an eﬃcient
income tax system involves no distortions in labor supply and hence no excess burden. Second,
Pareto eﬃcient income tax systems can be time-consistent even when the degree of correlation
in ability types is large. Moreover, time consistency is more likely when governments have less
progressive policy agendas (i.e., lower spending and less redistribution). As we have argued, this
provides a theoretical rationale for believing that the equity-eﬃciency trade oﬀ may be steeper
9 Understanding what these third best policies look like is a challenging problem because when the government
cannot commit, the revelation principle does not hold. In a two period Principal-Agent model with variable types,
Battaglini (2003b) fully characterizes the optimal renegotiation proof contract extending the revelation principle
to this dynamic environment. He shows that when the second best optimal contract is not time consistent, the
third best optimal contract involves the agent playing a mixed strategy. The optimal contract induces the high
type agent to partially pool with the low type in the ﬁrst period; and the degree of pooling monotonically increases
with the level of types’ persistence.
24than suggested by the static Mirrlees model.
It is well worth understanding how general these conclusions are. Our analysis of the two
period model shows that risk neutrality is a necessary condition for our result about distortions.
However, we also found that when individuals’ risk aversion is not too high, the basic pattern of
earnings under an eﬃcient tax system is the same as in the risk neutral case. Thus, the broad
features of eﬃcient tax systems that we identify in our basic model are robust to introducing
risk aversion. There are many other directions that the model could usefully be extended. For
example, it would be interesting to allow for more than two ability types. We leave this and other
extensions for future work.
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268A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :It is obvious that UL holds with equality, so we will just show that ICH (h1)
is binding. Let (b x,b y) solve the relaxed problem and suppose that ICH (h1) is not binding. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that for all t>1a n dh i s t o r i e sht, the constraint ICH(ht)i sn o t
binding. To see this, suppose that for some time period b t and some history hb t = {θ1,...,θb t−1},
ICH(hb t) were binding. Suppose ﬁrst that θ1 = θH. Then consider the allocation (x,b y)i nw h i c h
xb t(θH;hb t)=b xb t(θH;hb t)+ε; xb t(θL;hb t)=b xb t(θL;hb t);
and x1(θH;h1)=b x1(θH;h1) − δ
b t−1εPr((hb t,θH)|θ1 = θH )
for ε > 0 and all the remaining consumptions are unchanged. Observe that the expected utility




δt−1xt(θt;ht)|θ1 = θH ]=E[
∞ X
t=1
δt−1b xt(θt;ht)|θ1 = θH ].
It follows that (x,b y)s a t i s ﬁes ICH(h1) and yields the same value of the objective function as
(b x,b y). It is also satisﬁes R and UL.
Next suppose that θ1 = θL. Then consider the allocation (x,b y)i nw h i c h
xb t(θH;hb t)=b xb t(θH;hb t)+ε; xb t(θL;hb t)=b xb t(θL;hb t);
and x1(θL;h1)=b x1(θL;h1) − δ
b t−1εPr((hb t,θH)|θ1 = θL)
for ε > 0 and all the remaining consumptions are unchanged. Observe that the expected utility







δt−1b xt(θt;ht)|θ1 = θL].
It follows that (x,b y)s a t i s ﬁes UL. It also yields the same value of the objective function as (b x,b y)
and satisﬁes R.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eICH (h1) is not binding under (b x,b y)i tw i l ln o tb eb i n d i n gu n d e r
(x,b y)f o rε suﬃciently small.




V (θH | h1)
s.t. UL,R
27This implies that (b x,b y)i ss i m p l ya ne ﬃcient allocation in which V (θL | h1)=u.B u t , b y
assumption, u is suﬃciently high that this fails to satisfy at least one of the high types’ incentive
constraints ICH(ht). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :Let (x,y) be an allocation satisfying the constraints of the relaxed problem.
We will show that for all t ≥ 2w ec a nﬁnd xt such that the allocation (xt,y)( i )s a t i s ﬁes all the
constraints and yields the same value of the objective function as (x,y); (ii) satisﬁes ICH(hτ)
with equality for all periods τ ∈ {2,...,t} and all histories hτ; and (iii) is identical to (x,y) for all
periods τ >tand all histories hτ. This implies the result.
We prove our claim by induction. Consider the claim for t = 2. Suppose that ICH (h2)i sn o t
binding after some history h2. Suppose ﬁrst that h2 = {θL}, so that the high type was a low type
in period 1. Since ICH (h2) is not binding, there must exist some ε > 0s u c ht h a t :
V (θH |h2)=x2(θL;h2) − ϕ(y2(θL;h2)/θH)+δEθHV (θ3 |{ h2,θL})+ε
Now let x2 satisfy
x2





and otherwise equals x. Thus, all we have done is to take consumption away from the high type
after history h2 and give the expected discounted value to the low type in period one. Clearly, this
does not eﬀect the value of the objective function. Nor does it eﬀect the (R)o r( UL)c o n s t r a i n t s .
It satisﬁes the ICH(h2) constraint with equality by construction. We need to check that the
ICH(h1)c o n s t r a i n ti ss a t i s ﬁed; i.e., that:
V 2(θH |h1) ≥ x2
1(θL;h1) − ϕ(y1(θL;h1)/θH)+δEθHV 2(θ2 |{ θL})
where V 2(θt | ht) is the value function corresponding to the allocation (x2,y). We have that:
V 2(θH |h1)=x2
1(θH;h1) − ϕ(y1(θH;h1)/θH)+δEθHV 2(θ2 |{θH}).
= V (θH | h1)
≥ x1(θL;h1) − ϕ(y1(θL;h1)/θH)+δEθHV (θ2 |{θL}).
= x2
1(θL;h1) − δεαLH − ϕ(y1(θL;h1)/θH)+δEθHV 2(θ2 |{θL})+δεαHH
≥ x2
1(θL;h1) − ϕ(y1(θL;h1)/θH)+δEθHV 2(θ2 |{θL})
28where the third equality follows from the fact that (x,y)s a t i s ﬁes ICH(h1) and the fourth follows
from the fact that αHH ≥ αLH.
Next suppose that h2 = {θH} so that the high type was also a high type in period 1. Again,
there must exist some ε > 0s u c ht h a t :
V (θH |h2)=x2(θL;h2) − ϕ(y2(θL;h2)/θH)+δEθHV (θ3 |{h2,θL})+ε
Again, we will show that we can ﬁnd an alternative allocation that yields at least the same value
of the objective function, satisﬁes all the constraints of the relaxed problem and has the property







and equals x otherwise. Thus, all we have done is to take consumption away from the high type
after history h2 and give the expected discounted value to the high type in period 1. Clearly, this
does not eﬀect the value of the objective function. Nor does it eﬀect the R or UL constraints. It
satisﬁes the ICH(h2) constraint with equality by construction and has no eﬀect on the ICH(h1)
constraint.
Now suppose that the claim is true for τ =2 ,...,t − 1 and consider the claim for t.S i n c e
the claim is true for t − 1, we can ﬁnd xt−1 such that the allocation (xt−1,y)s a t i s ﬁes all the
constraints and yields the same value of the objective function as (x,y); (ii) satisﬁes ICH(hτ)
with equality for all periods τ ∈ {2,...,t − 1} and all histories hτ; and (iii) is identical to (x,y)
for all periods τ >t− 1a n da l lh i s t o r i e shτ.I f( xt−1,y) is such that ICH (ht) is binding for all
histories ht then we can simply let xt = xt−1.
If this is not the case, there must exist some history ht such that ICH (ht) is not binding.
Again, there are two possibilities, ht = {ht−1,θL} and ht = {ht−1,θH}. In either case, in the
same manner as above, we can ﬁnd e x such that the allocation (e x,y) (i) yields the same value of
the objective function as (xt−1,y) (and hence (x,y)); (ii) satisﬁes ICH(ht) with equality; and (iii)
equals (xt−1,y) (and hence (x,y)) for all periods τ >tand all histories hτ.I fht = {ht−1,θH}
then e x will also satisfy ICH(hτ) with equality for all periods τ ∈ {2,...,t−1} so we can let xt = e x.
If ht = {ht−1,θL} and αHH > αLH,t h e nICH(ht−1) will hold strictly. However, in this case,
since the claim is true for τ = t − 1w ec a nﬁnd b x such that the allocation (b x,y)( i )s a t i s ﬁes all
29the constraints and yields the same value of the objective function as (e x,y); (ii) satisﬁes ICH(hτ)
with equality for all periods τ ∈ {2,...,t−1} and all histories hτ; and (iii) is identical to (e x,y)f o r
all periods τ >t− 1a n da l lh i s t o r i e shτ.W ec a nt h e nl e txt = b x. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :F r o m( 1 )w eh a v et h a t :
V (θH |ht)=V (θL |ht)+Φ(yt(θL;ht)) + ∆EV(θt+1 |{ht,θL}).
We have that
∆EV(θt+1 |{ht,θL})=δ (αHH − αLH)V (θH |{ht,θL})+δ (αHL − αLL)V (θL |{ht,θL})
where V (θ|{ht,θL}) is the expected lifetime utility of an individual who has type θ in period t+1
after history {ht,θL}.B u tb y( 1 )w eh a v et h a t :
V (θH |{ht,θL})=V (θL |{ht,θL})+Φ(yt+1(θL;{ht,θL})) + ∆EV(θt+2 |{ht,θL,θL})
= V (θL |{ht,θL})+Φ(yt+1(θL;{ht,θL})) + δ (αHH − αLH)V (θH |{ht,θL,θL})
+δ(αHL − αLL)V (θL |{ht,θL,θL}).
Thus, we have that
∆EV(θt+1 |{ht,θL})=δ(αHH − αLH)Φ(yt+1(θL;{ht,θL}))
+δ2 (αHH − αLH)
2 V (θH |{ht,θL,θL})
+δ2 (αHH − αLH)(αHL − αLL)V (θL |{ht,θL,θL})
But again from (1) we have that
V (θH |{ht,θL,θL})=V (θL |{ht,θL,θL})+Φ(yt+2(θL;{ht,θL,θL}))
+δ (αHH − αLH)V (θH |{ht,θL,θL,θL})+δ (αHL − αLL)V (θL |{ht,θL,θL,θL}).
So that
∆EV(θt+1 |{ht,θL})=δ(αHH − αLH)Φ(yt+1(θL;{ht,θL}))
+δ2 (αHH − αLH)
2 Φ(yt+2(θL;{ht,θL,θL}))
+δ3 (αHH − αLH)
3 V (θH |{ht,θL,θL,θL})
+δ3 (αHH − αLH)
2 (αHL − αLL)V (θL |{ht,θL,θL,θL}).











a n dw eh a v et h ec l a i m e de x p r e s s i o n .Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :Let (x,y) solve the relaxed problem. Then by Lemmas 1 and 2 we may
assume with no loss of generality that x is such that (x,y)s a t i s ﬁes UL and all the incentive











The resource constraint can be written as G ≤ (1 − δ)
P∞
t=1 δt−1E[yt(θt;ht) − xt(θt;ht)]. By




















= µ[V (θH |h1)+
∞ X
t=1
δt−1E[ϕ(yt(θt;ht)/θt)|θ1 = θH ]








Substituting this into the resource constraint, yields,
G ≤ (1 − δ)
∞ X
t=1
δt−1E[yt(θt;ht) − µV (θH | h1) − (1 − µ)V (θL | h1) − ϕ(yt(θt;ht)/θt)].
U s i n gL e m m a3a n dUL we can write this as
G ≤ (1 − δ)
∞ X
t=1











31Thus, it follows that the earnings levels y must maximize the objective function (12) subject to
the constraint (13). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: We know that (x,y) is a solution to Problem PII. To show that it solves
Problem PI, all we need show is that the low type’s incentive constraint ICL(ht)i ss a t i s ﬁed for
all t and ht.F o rag i v e np e r i o dt and history ht, this requires showing that
xt(θL;ht) − ϕ(yt(θL;ht)/θL)+δEθLV (θt+1 |{ht,θL})
≥ xt(θH;ht) − ϕ(yt(θH;ht)/θL)+δEθLV (θt+1 |{ht,θH})
or, equivalently, that
xt(θL;ht) − xt(θH;ht) ≥ ϕ(yt(θL;ht)/θL) − ϕ(yt(θH;ht)/θL) (14)
+δ[EθLV (θt+1 |{ht,θH}) − δEθLV (θt+1 |{ht,θL})]
From the fact that ICH(ht) holds with equality, we have that
xt(θL;ht) − xt(θH;ht)=ϕ(yt(θL;ht)/θH) − ϕ(yt(θH;ht)/θH) (15)
+δEθH [V (θt+1 |{ht,θH}) − EθHV (θt+1 |{ht,θL}])
We can use this to prove the desired inequality. Note ﬁrst that
[EθHV (θt+1 |{ht,θH}) − EθHV (θt+1 |{ht,θL})] ≥ [EθLV (θt+1 |{ht,θH}) − EθLV (θt+1 |{ht,θL})].
To see this, note that
[EθHV (θt+1 |{ht,θH}) − EθHV (θt+1 |{ht,θL})] − [EθLV (θt+1 |{ht,θH}) − EθLV (θt+1 |{ht,θL})]
=( αHH − αLH)[V (θH |{ht,θH}) − V (θH |{ht,θL})]
+(αHL − αLL)[V (θL |{ht,θH})) − V (θL |{ht,θL})]
















Observe now that from the ﬁrst order conditions that for all j
ϕ0(yt+1+j(θL;{ht,θH}◦
+j)/θL)=θL,
32while (since γµ(1 − δ) > 1)
ϕ0(yt+1+j(θL;{ht,θL}◦
+j)/θL) ≤ θL.
Thus, for all j, yt+1+j(θL;{ht,θH}◦
+j) ≥ yt+1+j(θL;{ht,θL}◦
+j). Since Φ0 ≥ 0, it follows that the
above diﬀerence is non-negative.
It is also the case that
ϕ(yt(θL;ht)/θH) − ϕ(yt(θH;ht)/θH) ≥ ϕ(yt(θL;ht)/θL) − ϕ(yt(θH;ht)/θL).
To see this, note that the ﬁrst order conditions imply that yt(θL;ht) <y t(θH;ht). In addition, it







It follows from these two claims and from (14) and (15) that ICL(ht)i ss a t i s ﬁed.
Conversely, let (x,y) be a solution to Problem PI. We need to show that the earnings y
solve problem (3). Suppose not. Then (x,y) cannot solve the relaxed problem. Let (x0,y0)b ea
solution to the relaxed problem with y0 6= y. Then by Lemma 4, we know that y0 solves problem
(3). Moreover, we can assume by Lemmas 1 and 2 without loss of generality that x0 is such that
(x0,y0)s a t i s ﬁes ICH(ht) with equality for all ht and that UL binds. But then it follows by the
above argument that (x0,y0)s a t i s ﬁes ICL(ht)f o ra l lt and ht.T h i si sac o n t r a d i c t i o n .Q .E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :Let (x,y) solve the relaxed problem. It suﬃces to show that there exists a
β < 1s u c ht h a ti fβ ∈ (β,1) then the eliminated constraints ICL,IC L(H)a n dICL(L)a r es a t i s ﬁed.
To do this, we must ﬁrst establish some properties of the solution to the relaxed problem.
The Lagrangian for the relaxed problem is
L =( xH)β − ϕ(yH/θH)+δ[αHH((xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH)) + αHL((xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θL))] (16)
+λU{(xL)β − ϕ(yL/θL)+δ[αLH((xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH)) + αLL((xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θL))]}
+λH{(xH)β − ϕ(yH/θH)+δ[αHH((xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH)) + αHL((xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θL))]
−(xL)β + ϕ(yL/θH) − δ[αHH((xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH)) + αHL((xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θL))]}
+λHH{(xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH) − (xHL)β + ϕ(yHL/θH)}
+λLH{(xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH) − (xLL)β + ϕ(yLL/θH)}
+λR{µ[(yH − xH)+δ(αHH(yHH − xHH)+αHL(yHL − xHL))]
+(1 − µ)[(yL − xL)+δ(αLH(yLH − xLH)+αLL(yLL − xLL))]}.




























αLH λH + λLH/δαLH
. (21)
















































αLH λH + λLH/δαLH
. (25)
We can use these conditions to establish some facts about the solution to the relaxed problem.
Claim 1: λH > 0 implies λHH > 0a n dλLH > 0.
We ﬁrst show that λHH > 0. Suppose, to the contrary, that λHH = 0. Then it follows from the
ﬁrst order conditions for the high type’s consumptions that xHL = xH = xHH.B u t f r o m t h e






which implies that yHL/θL <y HH/θH.B u t t h e n , s i n c e xHH = xHL, it is clear that IC(HH)
would be violated.
W en o ws h o wt h a tλLH > 0. Again, suppose to the contrary, that λLH = 0. Then it follows


























which implies that yLL/θL <y LH/θH. But then it is clear that IC(LH) would be violated. ¥
Claim 2: λH > 0 implies that yHH ≥ yHL and yLH ≥ yLL
We ﬁrst show that yHH ≥ yHL. From the previous claim, we know that λHH > 0 and hence that
(xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH)=( xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θH).
But the ﬁrst order conditions for the high type’s consumptions together with the fact that λHH > 0
imply that xHL <x HH. Thus, yHH must exceed yHL.
We next show that yLH ≥ yLL. From the previous claim, we know that λLH > 0 and hence
that
(xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH)=( xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θH).
35It follows that if yLH <y LL we must have that xLL >x LH.F r o mt h eﬁrst order conditions for





















































Thus, if xLL >x LH we have that
ϕ0(yLH/θH)
θH




But this inequality implies that yLH >y LL - a contradiction. ¥
Claim 3: There exists a ε > 0a n daβ1 < 1 such that for all β ∈ (β1,1), λH ≥ ε.
Observe ﬁrst that there must be a κ > 0a n daβ0 < 1 such that for any β ∈ (β0,1), max{λH,λHH,λLH} >
κ. If this were not to be true, then the solution of the problem would be arbitrarily near to the
eﬃcient solution for some β close to 1. But, by assumption, the second best Pareto frontier is
strictly below the ﬁrst best frontier at β = 1 and, by the Theorem of the Maximum, the value
function of the maximization of a continuous function with continuous constraint correspondence
(as (16)) is continuous: therefore we would have a contradiction.
Now suppose, contrary to the claim, that for any ε > 0a n da n yβ1 < 1t h e r ei saβ ∈ [β1,1)
such that λH < ε. Then, since
λRµ
1−λHH/δαHL → 1a sβ → 1, there must be a sequence βn converging
to one, such that the multiplier λHH corresponding to βn is less than κ. We can therefore assume
















36We know that, as βn → 1,
λR(1−µ)
λU converges to one and λU converges to
1−µ
µ .T h u s ,w ec a nﬁnd
an n and some ²>0, such that for n>n,
βn(xLL)βn−1 > 1+².
But this contradicts the fact that βn → 1. ¥
Claim 4: There exists a β2 ∈ (β1,1) such that for all β ∈ (β2,1), yH ≥ yL.



















λR (1 − µ)
λU
It can be veriﬁed from (23) that yL > 0 for any β. By Claim 3 it follows that there exists some




























λR (1 − µ)
λU − λH
− ε
But we know that
lim
β→1

















which implies that yH ≥ yL. This implies the result. ¥
Claim 5: There exists some β3 < 1s u c ht h a ti fβ ∈ (β3,1), then yHL ≥ yLL.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the high type’s consumptions imply that limβ→1 λHH =0 . From














37We now prove that limβ→1
ϕ0(yLL/θL)














λR (1 − µ)
λU − αHL
αLL λH
But from the ﬁrst order condition (20) we also know that:

































It is easy to verify that λLH must be strictly positive for any β in [0,1] (otherwise (20) and






< 0, therefore, (27) implies that limβ→1
ϕ0(yLL/θL)




















































Assume not. Then we can construct a sequence hβni
∞
n=1 converging to one such that for any










HL are solutions corresponding to βn.L e t y0




LL be limits of the solution along this sequence (it is immediate to verify that the limits






θL .T h i si m p l i e st h a ty0
HL and y0
LL are not solutions of the program, otherwise we would
violate (28) and (26). But it is impossible that the limit of solutions is not a solution since, by
the Theorem of the Maximum, the solution of the program is an upper-hemicontinuous correspon-
dence. ¥
Now let β =m a x {β2,β3} < 1. Then we claim that if β ∈ (β,1) then IC(L), IC(HL)a n d
IC(LL)a r es a t i s ﬁed. The last two follow from the standard static argument given that (by
Claims 1 and 3) IC(HH)a n dIC(LH) hold with equality and (by Claims 2 and 3) yHH ≥ yHL
and yLH ≥ yLL.F o rIC(L)t ob es a t i s ﬁed we need that
(xL)β − ϕ(yL/θL)+δ[αLH((xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH)) + αLL((xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θL))]
≥ (xH)β − ϕ(yH/θL)+δ[αLH((xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH)) + αLL((xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θL))]
or equivalently that
(xL)β − (xH)β ≥ ϕ(yL/θL) − ϕ(yH/θL)+δ[αLH((xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH)) + αLL((xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θL))]
−δ[αLH((xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH)) + αLL((xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θL))]
= ϕ(yL/θL) − ϕ(yH/θL)+δ[αLH(UHH − ULH)+αLL(UHL − ULL)]
where UHH =( xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH), etc.




(xL)β − (xH)β = ϕ(yL/θH) − ϕ(yH/θH)+δ[αHH(UHH − ULH)+αHL(UHL − ULL)].
Thus, all we need to show is that
Φ(yH)+δ[αHH(UHH − ULH)+αHL(UHL − ULL)]
≥ Φ(yL)+δ[αLH(UHH − ULH)+αLL(UHL − ULL)]
39By Claim 4 we know that yL ≤ yH which, since Φ0 (y) > 0, implies that Φ(yH) ≥ Φ(yL). Thus it
suﬃces to show that
(αHH − αLH)(UHH − ULH)+( αHL − αLL)(UHL − ULL) ≥ 0.
But since
UHH − ULH =( xHH)β − ϕ(yHH/θH) − ((xLH)β − ϕ(yLH/θH))
=( xHL)β − ϕ(yHL/θH) − ((xLL)β − ϕ(yLL/θH))
= UHL − ULL + Φ(yHL) − Φ(yLL)
this requires that
(αHH − αLH)(UHL + Φ(yHL) − ULL − Φ(yLL)) + (αHL − αLL)(UHL − ULL) ≥ 0
or, equivalently that (αHH − αLH)(Φ(yHL) − Φ(yLL)) ≥ 0. This follows from the fact that, by
Claim 5, yHL ≥ yLL.
Now suppose that (x,y) is a second best eﬃcient allocation. Suppose that it did not solve the
relaxed problem. Then there would exist another allocation (b x, b y) that yields a higher value of
the objective function and satisﬁes UL,R,IC(H),IC(LH)a n dIC(HH)a l lw i t he q u a l i t y .I tm u s t
be the case therefore that it does not satisfy one or more of the eliminated constraints IC(L),
IC(HL), and IC(LL). But for β ∈ (β,1 )t h a tc a n n o tb et r u ea sw eh a v ej u s ts h o w n .Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :It follows from the ﬁrst order conditions for the high types consumptions
and earnings derived in the proof of the previous Lemma and the fact that λHH > 0t h a tyH and
yHH are set eﬃciently, while yHL is distorted downwards. It is also clear from the ﬁrst order

























































αLL λH − λLH/δαLL



































αLL λH − λLH/δαLL







which yields the result since λU − αHL
αLL λH − λLH/δαLL > 0.
We next show that the degree of distortion in the earnings of those who becomes low types in
the second period converges to 0 as β → 1. As noted in the proof of Claim 5 of Lemma 6, the
ﬁrst order conditions for the high type’s consumptions imply that limβ→1 λHH =0 . F r o mt h e




































λH = λR(1 − µ).
It will be shown in the next proposition that xL >x LL. This implies from the ﬁrst order conditions


























































and the result follows by the convexity of ϕ. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :For the ﬁrst statement we need to show that xH ∈ (xHL,x HH)a n d
xL ∈ (xLL,x LH). The ﬁrst claim follows immediately from the ﬁrst order conditions for the high
types consumption and the fact that (as shown in the proof of Lemma 6) λHH is positive. For the
second claim, note ﬁr s tt h a ts i n c e( a ss h o w ni nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a6 )yLL <y LH the incentive
constraint IC(LH) implies that xLL <x LH.T h u s ,i fxL / ∈ (xLL,x LH), then either it is the case
that xL ≤ xLL <x LH or it is the case that xLL <x LH ≤ xL.






αLL λH − λLH/δαLL
.
This implies that [αLL − αHL]λHδ ≥ λLH. But this means that
αHH
αLH
λH − λLH/δαLH ≥
αHH
αLH









From the ﬁrst order conditions for xL and xLH this implies that β(xLH)β−1 ≥ β(xL)β−1 which
means that xLH ≤ xL - a contradiction.






αLH λH − λLH/δαLH)
.
42This implies that λLH ≤ δ(αHH − αLH)λH.B u tt h i sm e a n st h a t
αHL
αLL
λH + λLH/δαLL ≤
αHL
αLL









From the ﬁrst order conditions for xL and xLL this implies that β(xLL)β−1 ≤ β(xL)β−1 which
means that xLL ≥ xL - a contradiction.
For the second statement, we need to show that for K ∈ {L,H}
β(xK)β−1 < αKHβ(xKH)β−1 + αKLβ(xKL)β−1.
Deﬁne υ(x)=( x)β and υ(xi)=vi for i = K,KL,KH. Consider a decrease in υK by φ (which
can be positive or negative) and a contextual increase of υKL and υKH by
φ
δ. After this change
the utility maintenance constraint and the incentive compatibility constraints at t = 1 and 2 are
obviously satisﬁed, since utilities at t = 2 change by the same amounts and the net present value
of the expected utility of reporting K at t = 1 is unchanged. It must be that this change does







































which implies β(xK)β−1 < αKHβ(xKH)β−1 + αLLβ(xKL)β−1. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a7 :Consider a particular period t ≥ 2a n ds o m eh i s t o r yht. We are interested in
knowing when (x∗
ht,y∗
ht) will be a solution to PI
ht.T h i si sc l e a r l yt h ec a s ei fht 6= h∗
t = {θL,...θL}
since Proposition 2 tells us that (x∗
ht,y∗
ht)i sﬁrst best eﬃcient. Therefore we focus attention on
the history h∗
t.
Observe that the program PI
h∗
t is identical to PI, but for two exceptions. On the one hand, the
reservation value of those with history h∗
t who are low types at time t is their expected continuation
value V ∗(θL | h∗
t) under (x∗,y∗) instead of u. On the other hand, the revenue requirement is not
G/(1 − δ), but the expected revenue generated from individuals with history h∗
t by (x∗,y∗). We
43will exploit this similarity to solve the program PI
h∗
t in the same way as we did the program PI.
However, a certain amount of work is necessary to show that the equivalent of Lemma 1 holds for
the relaxed program corresponding to PI
h∗
t.









s.t. V (θL | h∗
t) ≥ V ∗(θL | h∗
t)
and ICH(ht+j)&ICL(ht+j) ∀ ht+j º h∗
t ∀ j =0 ,1,..
Thus, we maximize the expected present value of revenues that can be extracted from individuals
with history h∗
t at time t subject to the constraint that those with low ability at time t have at








t)d e n o t et h e
solution to the revenue maximizing problem. We can immediately apply Lemmata 1-5 to this
problem and conclude that the earnings path yR
h∗



















+ V ∗(θL | h∗
t)]
We can now establish:






Proof: Since Pr(θt = θH |h∗
t )=αLH, for any history h∗
t+j, yR
t+j(θL;h∗





















Under our assumption that ϕ000 ≥ 0 the revenues are a strictly concave function of each yt+j,
implying that revenues are decreasing in yt+j(θL;h∗
t+j)o nt h ei n t e r v a l[ yR
t+j(θL;h∗
t+j),∞). From











¸1−t γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)
























¸1−t γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)






¸−1 γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)




So the right hand side of (31) is larger than the right hand side of (30), and concavity of the









Lemma 9 Let (xh∗
t,yh∗
t) solve the relaxed problem corresponding to PI
h∗
t in which the incentive
compatibility constraints for the low types are ignored. Then ICH(h∗
t) holds with equality.
Proof: Assume, by contradiction, that ICH(h∗
t) is not binding. Following the same argument as
in Lemma 1, it follows that (xh∗
t,yh∗
t)m u s tb ee ﬃcient starting from h∗
t. Therefore, using Lemma















Since revenues are strictly decreasing on the interval [yR
t+j(θL;h∗
t+j),∞), it follows that the tax
revenues generated by (xh∗
t,yh∗
t) must be strictly lower than the revenues generated by the ex
ante optimal solution (x∗
ht,y∗
ht) starting from h∗
t: but this is a contradiction because then the
revenues constraint would be violated. Q.E.D.




t)w i l lb ea
solution to PI
h∗
t if and only if y∗
h∗
































+ V ∗(θL | h∗
t)]
45Accordingly, to prove the result we need to show that y∗
h∗
t is a solution to the problem if and only
if (11) holds.
Since Pr(θt = θH |h∗















[γS (1 − δ)]





w h e r ew eh a v ed i v i d e dt h r o u g hb y1− γSαLH(1 − δ) and omitted the constants V ∗(θL | h∗
t)a n d
R∗ (h∗
t). We denote the Lagrange multiplier γS to distinguish it from the analogous multiplier γ
for the program solved by y∗.L e tyS
h∗
t denote the solution to this program. Under our assumption
that ϕ000 ≥ 0 the Lagrangian is a strictly concave function of each yt+j and the solution is unique.
We can now prove the Proposition:
Suﬃcient condition: If (11) is satisﬁed, then y∗
h∗
t is a solution to problem PS
h∗
t. We proceed in
three steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst show that
γS (1 − δ)αLL






¸1−t γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)
γµ(1 − δ) − 1
(34)






satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition:
γS (1 − δ)αLL


















if ht+j 6= h∗
t+j; and it would be fully eﬃcient otherwise. If (34) is not true, then after any
history h∗
t+j, concavity of the Lagrangian implies that the solution yS
t+j(θL;h∗
t+j) of (35) is strictly
larger than the ex ante optimal solution y∗
t+j(θL;h∗
t+j). Moreover, from Lemma 7 we know that
that the ex ante optimal solution y∗
t+j(θL;h∗











Since, as proven in Lemma 7, tax revenues are strictly decreasing on the interval [yR
t+j(θL;h∗
t+j),∞),
this would imply that the revenues corresponding to the earnings path yS
h∗
t are strictly lower than
46under the ex ante optimal solution y∗
h∗
t: it follows that the revenue constraint (32) is not satisﬁed
- a contradiction.
Step 2. Next we show that:
γS (1 − δ)αLL






¸1−t γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)
γµ(1 − δ) − 1
(36)





t and the consumption levels xS
h∗
t are such as to make ICH(ht+j) for all j and
ht+j º h∗






t)m u s t
solve problem PI
h∗
t. But if (36) is not true, then after any history h∗
t+j the solution yS
t+j(θL;h∗
t+j)
of (35) is smaller and hence more distorted than the ex ante optimal solution y∗
t+j(θL;h∗
t+j). Since




t, we would have that








t). But this is a contradiction since
in this case it is impossible that all the constraints of program PI
h∗
t are satisﬁed and its value is
strictly larger than V ∗(θH | h∗
t).
Step 3. From Steps 1 and 2 it follows that
γS (1 − δ)αLL






¸1−t γ (1 − δ)(1− µ)
γµ(1 − δ) − 1
.





Necessary condition: If (11) is not satisﬁed, then y∗
h∗
t is not a solution to problem PS
h∗
t.




smaller than the revenue maximizing solution yR
t+j(θL;h∗
t+j). Let yh∗
t be an earnings path such that









t. Then this earnings path raises strictly more revenue and yields a strictly higher level of




t is not a solution to problem PS
h∗
t. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 : Let Ω = G +( 1− δ)u. Then, if (x∗,y∗) is a second best eﬃcient

























Let γ(Ω) denote the associated Lagrange multiplier. Condition (11) of Proposition 5 implies that,
when αLH
αHH ∈ (0,µ), there is a threshold γ > 1
µ(1−δ) such that (x∗,y∗)i st i m ec o n s i s t e n ti fa n d
only if γ(Ω) ≤ γ.L e tΩ b et h em a x i m u mv a l u eo fΩ such that the above problem has a solution.
Let Ω be the largest value of Ω such that there exists an eﬃcient allocation in which those who are
low types in period one have expected utility u and none of the high types’ incentive constraints















¸1−t (1 − µ)
1 − 1
γ(1−δ)
which is decreasing in γ. We know from our characterization of y∗(Ω)t h a t ,f o ra n yt:
Λ1 (y∗
t(θL;h∗
t;Ω)) = Λ2 (t,γ(Ω)).
F o ra l lo t h e rh i s t o r i e s ,y∗
t(θL;ht;Ω)i se ﬃcient.






s.t. V (θL | h1) ≥ u
and ICH(ht)&ICL(ht) for all t & ht.
Let (xR,yR) denote the solution to this problem. As in the proof of the previous proposition, we
can immediately apply Lemmata 1-5 to this problem and conclude that the revenue maximizing
48earnings path earnings path yR solves the problem:
max
























while for all other histories yR
t (θL;ht)i se ﬃcient. Note also that yR is completely independent of
Ω.
Now consider two values of Ω, e Ω,Ω0 ∈ (Ω,Ω) such that e Ω > Ω0.W ec l a i mt h a tγ(e Ω) > γ(Ω0).






















1 Λ2 (t,γ(Ω0)) − Λ
−1









so that the diﬀerence between the revenue maximizing income level yR
t (θL;h∗
t)a n dt h ec o n -
strained eﬃcient income y∗
t(θL;h∗





t;Ω0). Since these diﬀerences must have the same sign and since revenues are concave in
yt, it follows that y∗(e Ω) cannot generate more revenues than y∗(Ω0). This is a contradiction since
e Ω > Ω0.
To see that as Ω → Ω, γ(Ω) → 1
µ(1−δ) note that as Ω → Ω the incentive compatibility
constraints for the high types become non-binding, so taxation becomes eﬃcient. This implies
that γ(Ω) → 1
µ(1−δ). Similarly as Ω converges to Ω, γ(Ω)m u s tc o n v e r g et oi n ﬁnity, otherwise
some resources would be left to the high type and tax revenues would not be maximized. Q.E.D.
49